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Abstract
For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either
private nonprofit or public hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the
outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some non-monetary benefit
to the manager, or “bias” in the manner of production. Since nonprofit firms must
consume profits under restrictions, they trade off bias and income differently than for-
profit firms. This difference is exaggerated in services where the benefits of controlling
the details of production are particularly important but minimized when firms are hit
with a fixed-cost shock. We test these predictions in a panel of California hospitals,
finding evidence for each. These results suggest that a model of public or nonprofit
make-or-buy decisions should be more than a simple relabeling of a model derived in
the for-profit context.
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If you want a thing done well, do it yourself. - Napoleon Bonaparte
1 Introduction
An important decision faced by any major organization is which activities it will engage
in itself and which it will outsource to some outside provider. While the choice of a for-
profit firm to outsource rather than provide services directly is (relatively) well-understood
(Lafontaine and Slade 2007), little is known about how nonprofit and public firms make these
decisions. The outsourcing decision provides insight into the nonprofit sector, in particular,
because the nonprofit may be ceding control to a firm less likely to share its mission. Research
on hospital ownership often treats all service provision as within the firm, but rising costs
make outsourcing attractive in the health care industry. In this paper, we analyze the make-
or-buy decisions of public, nonprofit, and for-profit California hospitals, demonstrate robust
differences among ownership types, and provide both a theoretically-grounded explanation
for these ownership differences and tests of the proposed mechanism.
For-profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals in California vary significantly in the extent
to which they outsource service provision. During 1996-2008, for-profit short-term general-
care hospitals in California outsourced 25.7 percent of the non-physician costs of an average
service to outside providers.1 Nonprofits outsourced much less, 18.9 percent of the non-
physician costs of an average service, across a range of both medical and administrative
services. Balakrishnan, Eldenburg, Krishnan and Soderstrom (2010) show that these dif-
ferences in average outsourcing rates are robust to a number of controls for hospital and
market characteristics. Given the size of the hospital industry and continued health expen-
diture growth, these outsourcing levels are also economically important.
To analyze the differences in outsourcing among ownership types, we extend a well-known
model of nonprofit entrepreneurship by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) to include an outsourcing
decision. We assume that managers not only place value on net revenues (profits) but also
place some value on controlling the exact manner in which a service is performed, either for
their own intrinsic reasons, organizational incentives, or due to influence from some interest
group (e.g. elite workers) who have preferences about how the service is performed. When
outsourcing is cheaper, control must be balanced against cost-minimization. Does a manager
want more control or lower costs? In our model, managers in nonprofit firms are restricted in
how they can use excess revenue (spending must be consistent with the hospital’s nonprofit
1The outsourcing rate is roughly defined as the percent of the total direct costs of a service which are
from contracts with outside service providers. This is fully defined in Section 3.
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justification), and this restriction induces them to put different weights on these two char-
acteristics than for-profit managers do. Since, all else equal, a marginal unrestricted dollar
of excess revenues has higher value than a restricted dollar, outsourcing is more attractive
to managers of for-profit firms than similarly-situated nonprofit firms whenever the outside
producer has a comparative advantage in low-cost and low-control production. These out-
sourcing differences are amplified when control over the manner of production is particularly
important and dampened when a fixed-cost shock lowers net incomes.
We test these predictions on a rich dataset of California hospitals with service-specific
outsourcing measures and market characteristics over the period 1996-2008. For-profits
outsource consistently more than private nonprofits, and public hospitals outsource even less
than private nonprofits. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for hospital size
and scope, service-specific output, presence of a residency program, market characteristics,
as well as service, year, and county fixed effects.
To investigate the importance of control, we divide hospital services into classes of dif-
ferential managerial concern. For example, if elite workers are influential, controlling the
manner of production in physician-intensive services like cardiology or emergency services
may be more important, as compared to services that have little or no physician labor,
like groundskeeping or parking. We also highlight labor-intensive services, since control of
these services may be salient for public managers. We classify services as labor/physician
intense by measuring the share of physician or labor costs as a percent of total direct costs
within that service. Our prediction is that outsourcing differences should be most marked
for services where control is particularly important to the manager. In line with this pre-
diction, outsourcing differences between private nonprofits and for-profits are much bigger
for physician-intensive services, while there is no significant difference for non-physician-
intensive services. Public hospitals, by contrast, consistently outsource less than for-profits
across both of these service classes. The pattern for labor-intensive services, however, is quite
different. Labor intensity has no relationship with the private nonprofit outsourcing rates,
but public hospitals outsource labor-intensive services much less than similarly-situated for-
profits (or private nonprofits). Control of labor-intensive services is particularly important
to public managers, but not to private nonprofit managers, which is exactly what our model
predicts.
The model’s third prediction is that a fixed-cost shock should cause nonprofits to look
more like for-profits in their outsourcing decisions. We test this prediction by taking advan-
tage of California’s seismic retrofitting requirements, which hit different hospitals with very
different retrofitting cost shocks depending on their local geography. Nonprofit and public
hospitals that experience greater fixed-cost shocks outsource at rates similar to for-profits.
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Nonprofit and public hospitals persist in less outsourcing only if they experience relatively
small fixed-cost shocks. This prediction is also complementary with the importance of con-
trol, in that the convergence of nonprofit and for-profit outsourcing rates for big fixed-cost
shocks is most evident in physician-intensive and labor-intensive services.
This paper contributes to two literatures. There is a burgeoning literature on the
“boundary of the organization” and how public entities provide services (Hart, Shleifer and
Vishny 1997, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Nelson 1997, Brown and Potoski
2003, Martimort and Pouyet 2008, David and Chiang 2009, Levin and Tadelis 2010, Iossa
and Martimort 2012), but nearly every empirical investigation has focused on one owner-
ship type. These studies cannot address what is essentially “public” or “nonprofit” about
choices because they lack a control group of profit maximizers. Instead, they are compar-
ative static in nature, analyzing how organizations adjust to changes in the economic or
political environment. An important contribution of our work is that we can, first, identify
divergence in outsourcing decisions among ownership types in the cross-section, and second,
compare these differences across services and see how these differences respond to compara-
tive static changes. Hospitals are a particularly apt organization to investigate, because the
organizational forms span for-profit, private nonprofit, and various sorts of publicly-operated
institutions. A handful of papers have taken advantage of this diversity. Coles and Hesterly
(1998) touch on nonprofit and for-profit differences, but focus on how transaction costs influ-
ence which hospital services are outsourced. Balakrishnan et al. (2010) describe outsourcing
differentials at the level of the hospital. We take their correlations as motivation, show
that the large differences by ownership type are robust within services, and show that those
differences are consistent with a model in which nonprofits are induced by nondistribution
constraints to trade-off costs versus control at a different rate than for-profit firms do.
Second, there is a significant literature on the effects of nonprofit status on the behavior
of firms, in general, and hospitals, in particular.2 Sloan (2000) summarizes the particular
effects present in the hospital context due to moral hazard and the consumer’s asymmetric
information. This literature is particularly concerned with the effect of ownership on the
provision of service quality (Sloan et al. 2001, Picone et al. 2002, Eggleston et al. 2008),
but also on the role of competition (Duggan 2002), managerial compensation (Ballou and
Weisbrod 2003), and these characteristics combined with the question of what drives non-
profit behavior, more generally (Deneffe and Masson 2002, Horwitz and Nichols 2009, Chang
and Jacobson 2011, McClellan and Staiger 2000). The paper most related to ours, both in
context and approach, is Chang and Jacobson (2011), which looks at hospitals in California
2For a nice synthetic summary of the general issue of nonprofit behavior, see Malani, Philipson and David
(2003).
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and also uses seismic retrofitting as an exogenous cost shock. While they are concerned with
the question of what nonprofits “maximize,” we have a much more specific goal of looking
at one aspect of the production decision, outsourcing, to highlight an important difference
in the way nonprofit firms conduct their affairs. We focus on outsourcing as a component of
total production, but this is particularly relevant for answering the question of how mission
and production decisions are made differently by ownership type. Outsourcing can have real
effects on mission if there are significant elements of the service that are difficult to fully
specify in the contract. We see our work as complementary to the literature, where (to use
their terminology) we identify an additional dimension along which “perquisite-maximizing”
nonprofits differ from their “profit-maximizing” kin.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of nonprofit and
for-profit outsourcing behavior. Section 3 describes California hospital ownership types,
our data, and intensive-service measures. Section 4 describes the econometric specification
and discusses our results on outsourcing, control, and fixed cost shocks. We have a brief
discussion of alternative explanations in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6.
2 A Model of Outsourcing
Consider a model of nonprofit behavior that borrows heavily from Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001) but adds an outsourcing decision. We model the firm’s decisions about production
and outsourcing as controlled by a unitary actor, who we refer to as the manager. Assume
the firm’s manager solves
max
n,q,b
u(n, q, b|ρ) = n+ v(q) + ρb,
subject to
q + n ≤ I(b)− F,
n ≤ 0 for nonprofits,
where the manager maximizes over qualifying spending (q), non-qualifying spending (n), and
production bias (b). The difference between qualifying and non-qualifying spending captures
how nonprofits and for-profits spend excess revenues (profits) differently. Qualifying spend-
ing is interpreted broadly as anything that can be purchased with excess revenues without
violating the rules governing nonprofit behavior. It might include, for example, uncompen-
sated care, an improved physical working environment of the manager or employees, or more
generous benefits. Non-qualifying spending includes all other goods on which a manager
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could spend excess revenues, including things barred to the nonprofit manager, like taking
these excess revenues home as profits or distributing them to shareholders. Returns to qual-
ifying spending, v(q), are increasing and concave, so qualifying spending is always valuable
but has diminishing marginal returns. Non-qualifying spending, by contrast, is assumed to
have a constant marginal value. This constant return to non-qualifying spending is just a
modelling convenience. All we really require is that the marginal value of an additional dollar
decreases more quickly when the scope of spending is restricted. Nonprofits are constrained
to avoid non-qualifying spending, so nonprofits must consume all net revenues as qualify-
ing spending, q.3 Denote by q the level of spending where the marginal value of qualifying
spending passes below that of non-qualifying spending (i.e., where v′(q) = 1).
A manager may decrease the revenues available to spend by increasing production bias,
b. Production bias captures the degree of deviation in production from the perfect profit-
maximizing manner for the given service. As a normalization, let b = 0 represent the
profit-maximizing level of production bias, so any b > 0 means bias has been traded for
income, I(b). Assume that I(b) is concave and decreasing in b. Moving away from the
net-income-maximizing manner of production is costly, but may have value to the manager
if his incentives are not solely determined by net revenues. The value placed on additional
control over the manner in which the service is provided is parameterized by ρ.
Production bias, b, should be also interpreted broadly to allow the maximization to reflect
a diversity of missions beyond profit maximization. It represents some aspect of production
(either input or output) about which the manager has preferences over and above this aspect’s
impact on net revenues. The ρ term captures both the manager’s own intrinsic value, the
value he is induced to place on bias as a result of the historical orientation of the organization,
and the influence of other interest groups, such as elite workers, governing boards, or those in
a position of political power over the manager.4 The manager could enjoy biasing production
out of an altruistic impulse, whereby the manager actually gets psychic benefit from providing
excellent quality care or care to particular groups (such as the poor), over-and-above the
net revenue consequences. A governing board or tax authority may encourage the manager
3An alternative interpretation for the decreasing marginal value of qualifying spending comes from recog-
nizing that the costs of disguising non-qualifying spending as qualifying increases in the amount of spending
so disguised.
4A more detailed version of this model could include interest group effort to exert influence over the
manager with some cost to the interest group. This model would be similar to Glaeser (2003). In the model
above we do not assume differential pressure or effort on the part of workers in nonprofit versus for-profit
firms. If we did include this elite worker effort, nonprofit elite workers would have a greater incentive to exert
effort because of the diminishing marginal returns to income in the nonprofit firm would make the nonprofit
manager more responsive to influence. The direction of the behavioral differences between nonprofit and
for-profit managers would remain the same, but the differences would be larger. We present only the basic
case above, and let the empirical section reveal the size of the differences.
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to bias production towards the firm’s mission. Finally, the manager could be captured or
influenced to place extra weight on the impact of this service on some organized group,
perhaps elite workers. Services with substantial elite worker production might have greater
potential for quality improvement, for example, and the workers, or the manager himself,
may benefit from being associated with a high-quality medical institution. In the hospital
context, physicians are highly trained specialists with significant informational advantages
and decision influence. The manager might alter the service provision by changing b in
services with a large percentage of elite workers. These workers could prefer a production mix
that differs from income-maximizing levels, and pressure the manager to alter the provision
of services they dominate. This high-quality service could produce better patient outcomes
(influencing revenues) but be costly to implement (influencing costs). The revenue and cost
effects of this high-quality service appear in I(b), but the private benefits appear in the
ρb term. As a second example, political pressures to over-employ labor could induce the
manager to bias service provision. In that case, the manager might alter the mix of inputs
away from the net-revenue-maximizing mix in favor of labor inputs. It is important to note,
in all these cases, that production bias can be either good or bad from an overall efficiency
standpoint, depending on the other characteristics of the market. Deviation from profit-
maximizing choices may not reduce social welfare if quality is difficult to observe, as is often
the case in health care markets with asymmetric information.
In-House Production Figure 1 represents the equilibrium choice over income versus pro-
duction bias before outsourcing is introduced, holding ρ fixed. Bias (b) appears on the x-axis
and net income I on the y-axis. Let j = fp denote for-profit and j = np denote nonprofit.
The solid thick curve is the in-house production possibilities curve over combinations of in-
come and bias choices, labeled I(b). The optimal choice for each firm is where the manager’s
indifference curve is tangent to the in-house production possibilities curve. Beginning at the
lower right, with low income and high bias, for-profit and nonprofit indifference curves are
the same, with slope above −ρ. However, as we move towards the upper left, bias is traded
off for income. Because nonprofit net revenues can only be used for qualifying spending, q,
the value of additional income falls off more quickly for the nonprofit. Note this in the gray
“nonprofit IC” line, which begins curving away from the black “for-profit IC” as more bias is
traded off for income. The optimal choices for the two ownership types are shown by the dots
on the in-house production possibilities curve, with biases bj and incomes Ij ≡ I(bj) − F .
Tangency assures that the bias level chosen by the for-profit will be lower than the non-
profit, or bfp ≤ bnp. Intuitively, since the marginal value of a constrained dollar is always
weakly less than the marginal value of an unconstrained dollar, and reducing bias delivers
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Figure 1: Optimal In-House Production by Firm Type
Income 
Production Bias 
constrained dollars to non-profits and unconstrained dollars to for-profits, nonprofits choose
weakly higher levels of production bias than for-profits do.
Outsourcing Assume now that the firm could choose to outsource production to some
third party, who offers a different income for a given level of bias. Let Ij(b) be the threshold
income for a given bias, b, where for an offered income above that threshold a type-j firm
would choose to outsource instead of producing in-house. The points Ij(b) are exactly the
maximal indifference curve attainable in-house. Figure 2 illustrates these thresholds for one
fixed level of production bias, bo, the dotted vertical line. For a given level of bias bo, the cutoff
income Inp(bo) begins where bo intersects the nonprofit indifference curve, as indicated by the
small circle. The for-profit threshold income, Ifp(bo), falls below, at the circled intersection of
the for-profit indifference curve and bo. For this particular level of bias, bo, the for-profit finds
outsourcing at this level of bias (weakly) more attractive than the nonprofit. Alternatively
stated, once it begins consuming non-qualifying benefits, the for-profit firm requires lower
income to choose outsourcing over own-production, or Inp(bo) ≥ Ifp(bo), as shown on the
y-axis.
Because the marginal rate of substitution between bias and income for the for-profit firm
is weakly smaller (in absolute size) than that of the similarly-situated nonprofit firm, these
8
Figure 2: Outsourcing Income Threshold by Firm Type
Income 
fixed threshold 
threshold 
Production Bias 
two indifference curves cross exactly once and the crossing occurs between their optimal
in-house bundles. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2 where the intersection is contained in a
gray dotted circle, labeled on the corresponding axes as (b∗, I∗). The following proposition
formalizes this intuition. Proofs for all propositions are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 If bfp 6= bnp, then there is a unique combination (b∗, I∗) such that u(0, I∗, b∗) =
u(I∗ − q, q, b∗). This combination is bracketed by the two in-house choices, in the sense that
bfp < b∗ < bnp and Ifp > I∗ > Inp. Furthermore,
1. If b ≥ b∗ then Inp(b) ≤ Ifp(b).
2. If b ≤ b∗ then Inp(b) ≥ Ifp(b).
Finally, let Io(b) represent the frontier of income-bias pairs available through outsourcing.
A firm of type j will outsource if and only if there is some bias level such that Io(b) > Ij(b).
From this proposition, we can characterize when to expect for-profit firms to outsource
more than nonprofits and vice-versa. Intuitively, if outsourcing is the low-cost but low-bias
option, we should see for-profit firms outsourcing at a higher rate than nonprofit firms. If
outsourcing is the high-cost and high-bias option, we should see nonprofit firms outsourcing
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Figure 3: Outsourcing Opportunity Set Where For-Profit Firm Outsources but Nonprofit
Firm Does Not
Production Bias 
Income 
threshold 
threshold 
at a higher rate. Obviously, if outsourcing is lower cost for all bias levels, everyone will
outsource, and if it is higher cost for all bias levels, no one will.
The following corollary formalizes these ideas.
Corollary 1 If Io(b) > I(b) only if b < b∗, then a nonprofit firm will outsource only if an
otherwise identical for-profit firm does. If Io(b) > I(b) only if b > b∗, then a for-profit firm
will outsource only if an otherwise identical nonprofit firm does.
Figure 3 represents a situation from Corollary 1 in which the outsourcing opportunity
is relatively cheap for low levels of bias, but producing in-house is relatively cheap for high
levels of bias. The thick multi-stripe frontier labeled Io(b) represents the new possibilities of
outsourcing opportunities. The thick line I(b) remains the in-house production possibilities.
The outsourcing frontier lies above in-house production only for low levels of bias. Given
this arrangement of production possibilities curves, a for-profit will choose to outsource, since
the outsourcing frontier lies above the for-profit firm’s maximal in-house indifference curve,
while a nonprofit firm will not, as the outsourcing frontier is always below the nonprofit
firm’s maximal in-house indifference curve.
The propositions and figures above show how outsourcing behavior differs for fixed pa-
rameters. However, we can also investigate the comparative static predictions by firm type.
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The model predicts that a shock to fixed costs (F increasing) will differentially affect the
two firm types. A fixed-cost shock is a shift in net income for all levels of bias. For profit-
maximizing firms consuming some non-qualifying spending, changes in fixed costs have no
effect on behavior (assuming they have sufficient profits to continue to consume non-qualified
spending). By contrast, fixed costs immediately affect the nonprofits’ income-bias tradeoff.
If F rises, the marginal benefit of qualified spending rises, so the opportunity to outsource to
a low-cost/low-bias producer becomes more attractive to a nonprofit firm. This comparative
static arises naturally from the non-distribution constraint, but it would not obtain in a
model where the only difference between nonprofits and for-profits is a difference in ρ, the
importance of control over production bias. In that alternative model, a fixed shock does
not affect the marginal value of a dollar of additional net revenues and so would not affect
outsourcing decisions (other than through shut-down constraints). An important contribu-
tion of this paper is our ability to show this distinction through an exogeneous fixed cost
shock to firms.
A second comparative static is the response to a change in the importance of control over
production (ρ). If control over production is more important, a larger income advantage is
required to induce firms to outsource to a low-bias producer. Since nonprofits must consume
this income through qualifying spending, the effect is more pronounced for them. Of course,
this static also implies that if nonprofits have consistently higher ρs for (some subset of)
services, they will outsource (that subset of) services less, ceteris-paribus. We are able to
test this in our application to hospitals, since these are necessarily multi-product firms with
a variety of services with different expected bias levels.
Finally, since the divergence of the nonprofit from the profit-maximizing choice is larger
for larger ρ, there is a cross-partial prediction, where the effects of a fixed-cost shock will be
larger for services where control over production is more important. The following proposi-
tion formalizes these three comparative statics.
Proposition 2 If b < b∗, then INP (b) − IFP (b) is positive, increases in ρ, decreases in F ,
and the marginal effect of increasing F is larger (in absolute value) as ρ increases.
These propositions have implications for both the level of outsourcing in similarly-situated
nonprofit and for-profit firms as well as for the mix of services they outsource. We can illus-
trate these predictions with a few common hospital services. Overall, we will see empirically
that nonprofits generally outsource less than for-profits in all services, as shown in Propo-
sition 1. A second effect also arises: as the value of production bias increases, we should
see greater divergence between the outsourcing decisions of the nonprofit and the for-profit.
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Table 1 illustrates, with a few common hospital services, the four cases that arise from dif-
ferences in the cost savings of outsourcing versus the value of biasing production. Consider
a low-cost, low-bias-value service such as Groundskeeping. Many contractors likely exist
outside of the hospital and the contract is not difficult to write. Quality is relatively easy to
monitor. In addition, Groundskeeping is not a service that is likely to be key to the hospi-
tal’s mission or important to elite workers. Table 1 shows that nearly all hospitals outsource
this service, with for-profits outsourcing about 95 percent of groundskeeping on average,
and nonprofits outsourcing nearly 88 percent on average. Another service not central to
the mission or subject to the influence of elite workers is Plant Maintenance. In contrast to
Groundskeeping, Plant Maintenance likely involves a more complicated contract and special-
ized services, reducing cost savings, but still not likely to be high bias. As such, we expect
that hospitals of all types outsource this service less, but the rates should not differ much
between ownership types. In fact, for-profits outsource about 34 percent, on average, of their
Plant Maintenance services while nonprofits outsource about 5 percentage points less. In
the next two services, bias may be more important. Public Relations firms are common in
most markets, and thus may be relatively cheap to outsource. However nonprofits may wish
to have greater control over interactions with their community. We observe that nonprofits
outsource this service over 18 percentage points less than for-profits, at about 32 percent on
average. The average for-profit outsources over half of its Public Relations services. Finally,
for services that are both high cost and have a high value of biasing production, we should
see both ownership types largely keeping production in-house because of complicated con-
tracting, but for-profits will outsource slightly more. Anesthesiology is a good example of
a service where quality is important and also where elite workers play a key role. In this
service, outsourcing is rare for both ownership types. However, nonprofits outsource barely
more than 5 percent on average in Anesthesiology, whereas the average for-profit outsources
at a higher level of over 15 percent.5
In keeping with these examples, there are several reasons to focus on outsourcing as
the low-cost, low-bias-value option, that is Io(b) > I(b) for low b. In addition to the direct
contractual obligations, Io(b) also includes all the costs of composing and managing a (poten-
tially quite complex) contractual relationship. Duties and contingencies have to be clearly
specified and appropriately anticipated. Unanticipated contingencies may result in costly
renegotiations. Performance must be monitored, and a breach on either side can lead to
costly and protracted legal proceedings (Bajari and Tadelis 2001, Levin and Tadelis 2010).
More finely tuned control over the manner of production requires even more completely
5Service-specific full regressions of these four services showing the above effects in detail can be provided
upon request.
12
Table 1: Illustration of The Effect of the Cost of Contracting and The Value of Bias on
Predicted and Actual Outsourcing Rates
Value of Cost of Predictions Avg Pct Outsourced
Bias Contracting Level ∆ Service FP NFP ∆
Low Low High Small Groundskeeping 94.8 87.9 6.9
Low High Low Small Plant Maintenance 34.2 29.4 4.8
High Low High Big Public Relations 51.1 32.4 18.7
High High Low Big Anesthesiology 15.7 5.2 10.5
specified contracts and precise monitoring. Providing high quality service, for example, is
notoriously difficult to measure in a contractible way, and a contractor has strong incentives
to try to shade on quality to the extent that it lowers his costs. Similarly, a contractor
has strong incentives to try to game a contract that requires a “biased” production mix
(say favoring labor over capital), since returning to the optimal mix would reduce costs.
In both cases, the desire to game the contract increases when a contract specifies greater
divergence from the profit-maximizing production method. At some point, the costs of con-
tractually guaranteeing very high levels of control over specific details of production would
be prohibitive relative to in-house monitoring.
The cost of controlling production may also increase with outsourcing in this industry,
in particular, because of the structure of health care services. Hospitals are organized to
provide tertiary care, the most specialized consultative care for patients. Patients are referred
to hospitals from primary or secondary care, which are organized to provide more general
care. Thus, hospitals’ patients may already require the most specialized services in the local
market, so a full specification of appropriate performance is particularly difficult. In a sense,
the hospital gets the least standard cases, by design, and so a standardized contractual
solution may be particularly ineffectual. Of course, this pattern of comparative advantage
may not hold for every service, but it suffices, for our purposes, for it to hold on average.
2.1 Empirical Predictions
The theoretical model gives us four predictions to test regarding outsourcing behavior and
ownership type. They are:
1. Nonprofit hospitals should outsource less overall, across all services. (Corollary 1)
2. Differences in outsourcing between nonprofits and for-profits should be more pro-
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nounced for services where bias is important. (Proposition 2)
3. Differences in overall outsourcing between nonprofits and for-profits should decrease
as budgets tighten. (Proposition 2)
4. As budgets tighten, outsourcing differences should change the most in services where
bias is important. (Proposition 2)
We will examine the evidence for and against these propositions below.
3 Data and Institutional Setting
We examine the implications of the model using data on California hospitals, 1996-2008.
The data is an unbalanced panel of 433 short-term care general hospitals from the Annual
Financial Data series from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Devel-
opment (OSHPD). For each hospital, we know a wide variety of ownership, financial, and
operating characteristics, including ownership type, discharges, patient mix, and location.
California hospitals are of four ownership types: for-profit, nonprofit, local, and district.6
For-profit hospitals have a private residual claimant on profits, Nonprofits are 501(c)(3)
registered charitable organizations, and no part of the organization’s net earnings accrue
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.7 These first two categories are
private organizations, in contrast to the last two, which are publicly-run. Local hospitals are
operated as part of the budget of the local city or county, and overseen by a board appointed
by the elected local government. District hospitals are controlled by a directly-elected board
for each of California’s 85 health districts. These hospitals are funded by taxes at the district
level, patient receipts, and intergovernmental transfers.8
3.1 Measuring Outsourcing
The Annual Financial data includes a measure of total operating expenses for every ser-
vice provided by the hospital, from medical services to administrative tasks. However, the
6Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals are not included in this analysis.
7Separating out church-affiliated hospitals from non-affiliated nonprofits reveals a similar pattern for both
groups, although church-affiliated nonprofits have lower overall outsourcing levels.
8In fact, the situation is slightly more nuanced, because certain Districts license nonprofit or for-profit
providers to operate hospitals for them. We code these as for-profit or nonprofit, since the licensees are resid-
ual claimants on profits and have managerial discretion in structuring operations. For more detail about the
governance structures employed by California public hospitals, see http://www.chcf.org/publications/
2009/05/governance-models-among-california-public-hospitals
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OSHPD makes all hospitals also report operating expenses net of any physician expenses,
either from direct employment or through outsourcing. This is because most California
hospitals are legally prohibited from directly employing physicians. This facilitates cross-
hospital comparisons with the select few exceptions to this prohibition.9 This separation
is helpful in our case, since the make-or-buy “decision” in physician employment is not a
choice, but instead dictated by law. We can thus isolate the costs where a meaningful out-
sourcing decision is taking place. Reported total operating expenses are divided into two
categories: Total Direct Costs and Physicians’ Professional Component. Total direct costs
are the operating expenses net of physician costs. We use total direct costs in our analysis
in order to exclude physician fees and include only the remaining components of operations
which are salient to the make-or-buy decision.10
Now that we have a measure of a hospital’s total expenses which are subject to out-
sourcing decisions, total direct cost, we examine what component of these costs come from
outsourced sources. Within each service, the hospital reports the total costs divided into
broad component categories such as Salaries and Wages, Benefits, or Supplies. Costs at-
tributed to outsourced sources are recorded in two categories. The first, Professional Fees,
is essentially all outsourced labor costs. Professional Fees include (non-physician) medical
personnel not on the payroll, such as registered nurses or physical therapists. It also includes
legal or management consulting fees, audit personnel, or temporary contractors such as file
clerks. The second category of outsourced costs is Purchased Services. This category in-
cludes the costs of outsourced medical services such as a contracted laboratory or CT scan.
It can also include services such as repairs and maintenance, management services, linen
services, or credit and collection that were provided by an outside contractor.
We define a cost-based measure of service-specific outsourcing using the sum of the two
outsourced cost categories as a percentage of Total Direct Costs in that service. Formally,
for service s in hospital h in year t we define:
PctOuthst ≡ PurchasedServiceshst + ProfFeeshst
TotalDirectCosthst
× 100.
Our measure of outsourcing is the percent of the total direct costs that were outsourced
in that service for a given hospital-year observation. Hospitals differ most in the extent of
9A few exceptions to directly employing physicians include county hospitals, HMOs licensed under the
Knox-Keene Act (such as Kaiser), and teaching hospitals. See “Physician-Hospital Integration 2012: How
Health Care Reform is reshaping California’s Delivery System.” for The California HealthCare Foundation
by the Camden Group. April 2012.
10Total direct costs also excludes the reporting category of “Unassigned Costs,” which is expenses such as
Insurance, Depreciation, or Interest, since these costs cannot be outsourced.
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outsourcing of a given service, rather than the decision to outsource at all. Because of this,
we will defer the extensive margin to another paper, and focus here on the intensive margin
of the degree of outsourcing, which we will measure as log(PctOuthst).
3.2 Services
Hospitals in our sample offer a subset of 85 unique services. Table 2 lists the six major
categories of services with examples and the average outsourcing levels across all hospitals.
We see broad trends arise already in Table 2 across service types. The category with the
least amount of outsourcing overall is Daily Hospital Services, with mean outsourcing levels
of 7.1 percent and a standard deviation of approximately 11 percent. Daily Hospital Services
includes inpatient care such as surgeries and coronary care. Fiscal Services have the highest
rates of outsourcing at 28.5 percent on average, with services such as general accounting and
credit and collection. General Services also has high levels of outsourcing, on average 24
percent, for services such as laundry and linens and groundskeeping. The median hospital
offers 56 unique services, while the mean hospital offers 53.7.11
Table 2: Service Categories Description
Service Category Examples Mean Pct Std.
Outsourced Dev.
Daily Hospital Services Medical/Surgical Intensive Care, Coronary Care 7.1 11.0
Ambulatory Services Medical Transportation, Home Health Services 11.2 18.9
Ancillary Services Anesthesiology, Medical Equipment 21.2 32.8
General Services Laundry and Linens, Groundskeeping 24.2 33.5
Fiscal Services General Accounting, Credit and Collection 28.5 35.5
Administrative Services Hospital Administration, Public Relations 19.9 26.5
3.3 Services and Bias
Our model of outsourcing behavior implies bigger differences among ownership types when
control over the services is particularly important to the manager. Proposition 2 shows
11These main 85 unique services exclude three categories. 1. Several broad catch-all categories. (such as
“Other Daily Hospital Services”, the composition of which may vary across hospitals) 2. Services offered very
rarely (less than 300 hospital/year combinations, out of about 4500) 3. All medical research and education
services. The results are robust to including/excluding the rare services, and we explicitly report the results
when we limit the sample even further to only very common services.
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the difference between nonprofit and for-profit outsourcing behavior should increase in the
importance of production bias.
The literature on nonprofit hospital behavior focuses on physicians, in particular, as
likely candidates for elite workers with influence on the manager. Glaeser (2003) states, “the
modern hospital is an outcome of the increasing power of doctors, who shaped the hospital
toward their own interests.” At the extreme, Pauly and Redisch (1973) model the hospital
directly as a physicians’ cooperative. We need not go that far, however, and merely require
that physicians have some substantial influence on the induced preferences of the manager,
especially in domains where they have informational advantages and strong incentives to
influence decisions. To identify services where these elite workers are more prevalent, we
categorize a subset of services which are “physician-intensive.” As described in Section 3.1,
each service’s physician costs are reported separately from total direct costs because of the
prohibition on direct employment. However, we can use these costs to create an index of
services which rely heavily on physician inputs. We rank each service by the average fraction
of total direct costs attributable to physician services. Those services in the top quintile of all
services are designated as “physician-intensive services.”12 These services have the highest
percentage of physician costs as a percent of their total costs among all the 85 hospital
services.13
Outside of private nonprofits and for-profits, public hospitals may have a different pref-
erence for bias. Services that are particularly labor-intensive could be salient to political
overseers and regulators, either by satisfying their mission or through furthering political
support. Local hospitals are run within the city or county government, and political princi-
pals may have a desire to disguise redistribution as public employment (Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly 2000),(Clark and Milcent 2011). Other mechanisms for bias may be “Keynesian”
employment policy or even capture by organized labor. We identify labor-intensive services
using a similar method to that described for physician-intensive services. For each service
in each hospital-year, we calculate the fraction of direct costs represented by the categories
12We used an alternative proxy in a prior version of this paper, where we followed the OSHPD division of
services into revenue-generating and non-revenue-generating subsets. Revenue-generating services are those
for which the hospital bills insurance and patients, thus these services are generally medical services, where
physicians may have a greater impact on management policy. Non-revenue generating services are services
which the hospital must provide for its operations, like groundskeeping, parking, and accounting, but for
which the hospital does not generally charge. The results are quite similar for this proxy of physician-
intensity. These results broadly square with some results broadly contrasting clinical and non-clinical costs
at the hospital level (Balakrishnan et al. 2010).
13Physician-intensive services are pediatric intensive care, neonatal intensive care, adult psychiatric acute
care, physical rehabilitation care, emergency services, clinic services, satellite clinic services, psychiatric
partial hospitalization, anesthesiology, pathological lab services, cardiology services, electromyography, elec-
troencephalography, pulmonary function services, psychiatric therapy, and medical staff administration.
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of Salaries and Wages and Employee Benefits. However, since some outsourcing may also
reflect labor costs, which would not be reported in direct salaries because it was outsourced,
this measure is a minimum estimate for the true share of labor in that service. We construct
two additional measures of labor intensity: the share of non-outsourced direct costs and the
share of total direct expenses of wages, benefits and contracts with outside providers. The
latter of these is an upper bound on the true labor intensity, while the former will lie between
the other measures. We define a service as “labor-intensive” if it is among the top third of
services for all three metrics.14 15
3.4 Hospital Characteristics
For hospital covariates we have measures of size, scope, mission, and market. The number
of discharges is a time-varying measure of size. For scope, we have the number of services
offered. Since residency programs may lend an extra incentive to produce in-house for train-
ing purposes, we include an indicator for this aspect of mission. We also include the fraction
of patient-days that are from Medicare and MediCal patients, since different patient mixes
may lead to different activities. We also have an indicator for whether the state of California
considers the hospital to be “rural,” since the opportunities to outsource may be less in a
less-developed market.16 To control for market characteristics, we match Census and Amer-
ican Community Survey data for 1996-2006 onto the Hospital Service Areas (HSAs) of each
hospital. HSAs capture local health care markets for hospital care as a collection of zipcodes
whose residents receive most of their hospitalizations from hospitals in that area. Market
characteristics include population, socioeconomic characteristics, and demographics. So-
cioeconomic and demographic characteristics include median household income, educational
attainment, and race percentages within the total population. The average unemployment
rate for the year in the hospital’s county is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. County
fixed-effects control for the general market in which the hospitals find themselves, and we
14If all labor-intensity metrics were the same, this procedure would identify 28 services, but since the
ranking differs to some degree among the metrics, only 14 services meet all three criteria. Expanding the
definition to include all services that meet two of the three criteria does not substantially alter our results.
15Labor-Intensive Services are medical/surgical intensive care, coronary care, definitive observation, acute
care, psychiatric acute-adult, alternate birthing center, physical rehabilitation, sub-acute care, skilled nursing
care, observation care, social work services, outpatient registration, nursing float personnel, and utilization
management.
16A subset of about 20 of California’s hospitals qualify for the Medicare “Critical Access Hospi-
tal” program for rural hospitals. These hospitals may face different incentives to provide services,
and to provide them in-house. We have included them in the sample, but we repeated the en-
tire analysis removing these hospitals, with no substantive effects on the results. For details on
this program, see http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNProducts/downloads/CritAccessHospfctsht.pdf.
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also include year and service fixed-effects to remove common economic shocks and maintain
comparisons to within a service.
Finally, to control for service-specific returns to scale, we have service-specific measures
of output. The specific measure reported by the OSHPD varies considerably by service.
For example, the measure of output for all daily hospital services is “patient-days,” and for
most ambulatory services it is “visits,” but for ancillary services it is very service-specific:
deliveries, operating minutes, tests, or sessions. For the non-medical services, printing and
duplicating services is measured in “reams of paper,” while that for social work services is
“number of personal contacts.”17 Since these measures are not commensurable, we will also
allow the coefficient on output in any regression that includes them to vary by service, with
the levels given in logs.
3.5 Summary Statistics and Preliminary Differences
Table 3 summarizes overall outsourcing, hospital characteristics, and market characteristics
by hospital ownership type.18 In the summary statistics, all hospital-level variables are
weighted by the number of services, since regressions are naturally weighted in that way.
Recall the first prediction of our model is that nonprofit hospitals should outsource less
overall than for-profit hospitals. Preliminary differences in overall outsourcing behavior
are evident in Table 3. For-profit hospitals outsource on average 25.7 percent of costs,
compared to only 19 percent for private nonprofit hospitals. Public hospitals, district and
local, also outsource less on average than for-profit hospitals. The fraction of services which
are completely outsourced varies in a similar way. The ownership types are much more similar
along the extensive margin, however, averaging about 87 percent of services outsourced to
some degree.
The remaining variables in Table 3 give a picture of each hospital ownership type. Private
for-profits are mostly small urban hospitals, averaging 6,146 discharges per facility and with
only 5 percent of hospitals located in rural areas. Accordingly, for-profit hospital markets
have the highest HSA populations, the highest median household income, and the second
highest percent black. For-profits also offer a high percentage of “common” services, defined
as a service offered by at least 3,000 hospital-years in the sample.
Nonprofit hospitals tend to be large medical complexes in relatively well-off areas. Non-
17A complete list of services and output measures available at http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/
Hospitals/AnnFinanData/Manuals/index.html.
18We present results for all 85 services, but in the Appendix we replicate our results by limiting the analysis
to the 36 most common services, which are offered by at least 3000 hospital/year combinations. They are
consistent with the full-sample results.
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profit hospitals average 11,145 discharges, second only to local hospitals, and 58 services.
They also have the smallest percentage of MediCal patients, at 20 percent, and the highest
percentage of Medicare patients, at 45 percent. Only 76 percent of the services offered by
nonprofit hospitals are “common” services. This is the lowest percentage among the owner-
ship types, indicating that nonprofit hospitals are offering the broadest scope of services.
District hospitals are small, traditionally rural hospitals. They have the smallest number
of average discharges, 5,770, and offer the lowest number of services, 52. District hospitals
are the second largest provider for MediCal patients, behind local hospitals. Over 57 percent
of district hospitals are classified as rural, almost five times the rate of the other ownership
types. Accordingly, district hospitals have the lowest average population in the HSA, the
lowest median income, and the lowest percent black.
Local hospitals are commonly very large teaching hospitals. These hospitals have the
largest average number of discharges, at 12,751. These hospitals serve the greatest percentage
of MediCal patients, at over 52 percent, and the least number of Medicare patients. The
mix of services offered is slightly less diverse than nonprofits but broader than the other two
ownership types. Local hospitals are by far the most likely to offer a residency program,
with 74 percent of the local hospital observations doing so.
In the next section, we detail our econometric approach to address outsourcing differences
while accounting for these differences in observables.
4 Econometric Specification and Results
4.1 Econometric Specification
Conditional on the decision to outsource the service to any degree, we model the underlying
preference for outsourcing intensity as
(1) log(PctOuthst) =
∑
j
βjOwn
j
ht + γ1s + γ2sOutputhst + ΓXht + hst,
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs due to outside con-
tracts, Ownjht is a dummy taking a value of 1 if hospital h is of ownership type j in year t, the
γs are service-specific intercepts and output slopes, and Xht is the set of controls described
in section 3.4, as well as county-specific and year-specific intercepts. The sample statistics
suggest that the primary difference among ownership types comes from differences in the
margin of intensity of outsourcing.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Ownership Type, Weighted by Number of Services.
For-Profit Private NP District Local
Percent Outsourced 25.72 19.02 20.71 18.12
(33.93) (28.68) (30.55) (27.82)
Service Completely Out 0.0561 0.0294 0.0455 0.0232
(0.230) (0.169) (0.208) (0.150)
Service Any Out 0.863 0.865 0.867 0.876
(0.344) (0.342) (0.340) (0.330)
Discharges 6146.8 11145.4 5770.0 12750.5
(4518.5) (7677.4) (6560.5) (10530.7)
Services Offered 53.09 57.72 51.98 55.93
(8.637) (9.807) (10.39) (7.993)
Pct. MediCal 27.60 20.19 38.42 52.92
(21.34) (15.88) (25.62) (13.84)
Pct. Medicare 44.28 45.25 37.05 16.40
(16.98) (13.85) (19.43) (11.01)
Common Service 0.829 0.760 0.812 0.785
(0.377) (0.427) (0.391) (0.411)
Residency Program 0.164 0.249 0.0237 0.736
(0.370) (0.432) (0.152) (0.441)
Rural 0.0532 0.119 0.576 0.123
(0.224) (0.324) (0.494) (0.329)
Peak Acceleration 0.496 0.475 0.465 0.525
(0.141) (0.227) (0.256) (0.225)
Pop. in HSA 502004.0 342956.8 131289.8 429471.6
(640210.0) (428365.0) (170351.8) (497746.1)
Pct. Black in HSA 6.845 5.237 3.237 7.771
(7.921) (6.299) (4.234) (9.852)
Pct. Poor in HSA 14.39 13.19 14.68 14.92
(6.892) (6.067) (6.232) (6.393)
med. HH Earn in HSA 45884.2 45793.7 38025.6 42543.1
(15285.5) (14549.9) (11250.8) (13140.0)
HS Grad in HSA 21.25 21.69 25.07 21.93
(5.042) (5.791) (5.685) (5.410)
Some Col. in HSA 25.66 26.61 27.44 25.63
(8.450) (9.000) (9.402) (9.353)
Pct Bach. in HSA 15.99 16.76 12.29 14.44
(6.641) (7.443) (5.633) (7.337)
Pct Grad/Prof in HSA 7.962 8.607 5.798 7.302
(4.816) (6.031) (3.384) (4.344)
County Unemp. 5.873 6.295 7.882 7.450
(1.874) (2.335) (3.869) (4.099)
N 57k 128k 27k 15k
Sample means and standard deviations in parentheses at the service x hospital x year level.
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We observe the choice of intensive margin only in the cases where the hospital decides to
outsource at all, a selected sample of the population. Naively dropping those observations
and ignoring the sample selection can lead to biased estimates, so we need to model the
extensive margin, whether to outsource at all, even if our primary interest is in outsourcing
intensity. Let ysht represent the payoff to firm h in year t from outsourcing service s at the
profit-maximizing intensity level, relative to the zero-normalized payoff of producing that
service entirely in house. The true payoff is unobservable, but our empirical model for this
outsourcing payoff is
(2) yhst =
∑
j
βjOwn
j
ht + γ1s + γ2sOutputhst + ΓXht + hst,
where the independent variables are identical to those in (2). Under joint normality, the
bias of our intensity estimate can be corrected by jointly estimating equations (2) and (1)
using a maximum likelihood estimator (Heckman 1979). In fact, as we will see below, the
evidence is that this bias is not significant, and the naive estimates are extremely close to
the corrected estimates.
Finally, there is a question of which covariates are appropriate to include as control vari-
ables. On one hand, we know that for-profit hospitals and the various types of nonprofits are
dissimilarly situated, on average, in terms of economic environment, patient mix, and even
scale and scope of operations. These differences are quite apparent in the sample means, and
these factors may be correlated with the attractiveness of outsourcing for reasons unrelated
to the ownership form of the hospital. Thus, we may want to control for these factors in
order to contrast the various nonprofit forms to a hypothetical similarly-situated for-profit
hospital. Failing to do so may result in biased estimates, since outsourcing differentials may
result from these third factors that are correlated with ownership.
On the other hand, the dissimilar situations did not arrive by happenstance. Instead, they
often result from hospitals of different ownership types making different business decisions.
To take one example, consider the hospital’s decision to operate in an urban market. We
know that, on average, for-profit hospitals are more likely to operate in urban markets than,
especially, their district hospital counterparts. If part of the reason they do this is because
for-profit hospitals want to avail themselves of the thicker markets for outsourcing services
in urban areas, then the decision to locate in an urban area is an intermediate outcome
to the decision to outsource at higher rates. If this is the case, then urban location is an
inappropriate control and including it will introduce bias. Put another way, if for-profit
hospitals have some unmodelled reason to prefer locating in urban locations, then those
for-profit hospitals that choose to operate in rural areas have some unusual (unobserved)
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characteristic. Thus, rural for-profits are not actually similarly situated to rural district
hospitals, which do not need this unusual characteristic to choose a rural setting. This
induced difference becomes a problem whenever that unobserved characteristic also influences
the attractiveness of outsourcing.
We believe that the omitted variable problem induced by having too few controls is more
severe than the intermediate-outcome problem, and we will, therefore, present regression
estimates including the full set of controls outlined. We also perform our estimates for
a smaller set of controls that are plausibly beyond the control of the firm, omitting the
controls for patient mix, residency, number of beds, number of services, and service-specific
output. These estimates are less likely to suffer from the intermediate-outcome problem
and consistently result in larger differences.19 The sample means, of course, reflect the
uncontrolled differences.
4.2 Prediction 1: Differences in Overall Outsourcing Levels
The first prediction of the model is that nonprofit hospitals should outsource less overall,
across all services. Table 4 shows the results of the full estimation of the Heckman selection
model and from a fixed-effects OLS estimate of outsourcing intensity. The coefficients report
marginal effects, calculated at the mean of the covariates. The first thing to note is the
similarity of the OLS and Heckman results. They are essentially indistinguishable, suggesting
that the naive approach, where we limit our attention to services that are outsourced at
all, is not leading to major biases. This result is not too surprising, given that about
87 percent of service-hospital-year observations are outsourced to some extent and we are
already controlling for many of the factors that might guide that decision. Given the high
level of similarity, for the rest of the analysis we will ignore selection and simply present OLS
results for brevity.
The overall outsourcing results are generally in accord with the first prediction of the
model about outsourcing differences. Table 4 reports the coefficients on each of the ownership
types as compared to the omitted category of for-profits. Nonprofit hospitals outsource 8
percentage points less than similarly-situated for-profits.20 District hospitals are similar to
private nonprofits, outsourcing about 13 percentage points less intensely than their for-profit
counterparts. Local hospitals are the least intense outsourcers of all, outsourcing nearly 39
19Results available on request.
20It is possible that some subset of the nonprofits in our sample are simply “for-profits in disguise”, by
somehow evading the non-distribution constraint. Here, and throughout, the existence of such firms would
attenuate our estimated differences, as compared to the actual difference between truly constrained nonprofits
and their unconstrained for-profit counterparts.
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Table 4: Outsourcing and Ownership Type
(1) (2)
OLS Heckman
Non-Profit −0.079∗ −0.079∗
(0.046) (0.046)
District −0.126∗ −0.126∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Local −0.386∗∗∗ −0.386∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089)
Log Discharges −0.125∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Log (Services) −0.064 −0.054
(0.155) (0.153)
Rural −0.016 −0.016
(0.069) (0.069)
Pct. MediCal 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pct. Medicare 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pop. in HSA −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pct. Black in HSA 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
County Unemp. −0.006 −0.006
(0.009) (0.009)
Pct. Poor in HSA −0.006 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
HS Grad in HSA −0.003 −0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Some Col. in HSA −0.005∗ −0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003)
med. HH Earn in HSA 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Residency Program 0.025 0.025
(0.037) (0.037)
county FE yes yes
service FE yes yes
service-specific output yes yes
Observations 196k 227k
OLS and Heckman models with dependent variable of natural log of the percent of costs that are expended on
outside contracts. All regressions include county fixed-effects, service fixed-effects. Standard errors, clustered
by hospital, in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10. Dependent variable excludes all physician
services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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percentage points less intensely than similarly-situated for-profit hospitals.
The hospital-level control variables relate to outsourcing in the ways we might expect.
Larger hospitals, either in terms of number of services or discharges, outsource less intensely
on average. Neither patient mix nor having a residency program is associated with out-
sourcing intensity. Demographic variables are only rarely significant in the either of these
regressions, likely because most important differences are already controlled for with county
fixed effects. Since this will be generally true throughout, we will not always report these
coefficients.
4.3 Prediction 2: Outsourcing and Bias-Intensive Services
Our model of outsourcing behavior implies that differences between nonprofits and for-profits
should be more pronounced in services where control over the services is particularly impor-
tant to the manager. The difference between nonprofit and for-profit outsourcing behavior
should increase in the importance of production bias. Here, we use the services described in
Section 3.3, where physicians are the elite workers in the hospital setting. We also investigate
labor-intensive services which may have particular importance to elected officials, regulators,
or unions. (Alesina et al. 2000, Clark and Milcent 2011).
Table 5 presents the results on Prediction 2 for variants of Equation (1), where ownership
type is interacted with an indicator for whether the service is physician-intensive (in column
(1)) or labor-intensive (in column (2)). The coefficients on the non-interacted ownership
dummies represent the relationship between ownership and outsourcing for non-intensive
services, while the sum of the coefficients on the interacted and non-interacted dummies
represent the relationship for intensive services. The second prediction of our model states
that if physician-intensity is a good proxy for the importance of control to elite workers (pace
labor intensity), we should see bigger differences in outsourcing for the physician-intensive
services. We discuss each service and ownership type in turn.
Consider, first, the results for physician-intensity in Column (1). There are no statistically-
significant differences in outsourcing of non-physician-intensive services between private non-
profits and their for-profit couterparts. District hospitals outsource slightly less in these
services. The local hospitals, by contrast, outsource even non-physician-intensive services
at much lower rates than all other ownership types. For physician-intensive services, by
contrast, all three types of nonprofits outsource much less intensely than their for-profit
counterparts, and the differences range from about 22 percent for the private nonprofits
and district hospitals, to over 60 percent for the local public hospitals. The differences
are statistically significant and large. As our model predicts, the difference in outsourc-
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Table 5: Outsourcing Differential by Physician- and Labor-Intensity
(1) (2)
Physician Labor
Non-Profit −0.058 −0.070
(0.045) (0.045)
District −0.115∗ −0.098
(0.070) (0.068)
Local −0.350∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.084)
Non-Profit x Physician Intensive −0.162∗∗∗
(0.061)
District x Physician Intensive −0.085
(0.094)
Local x Physician Intensive −0.253∗
(0.136)
Non-Profit x Labor Intensive −0.082
(0.065)
District x Labor Intensive −0.255∗∗
(0.099)
Local x Labor Intensive −0.391∗∗
(0.181)
Hospital Controls yes yes
HSA Controls yes yes
county FE yes yes
service FE yes yes
service-specific output yes yes
Observations 196k 196k
Dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs that are outside contracts. (d) indicates a
dummy variable. Standard errors, clustered by hospital, in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗
p < 0.10. Dependent variable excludes all physician services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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ing intensity between nonprofits, both public and private, and for-profits is much larger
for physician-intensive services than it is for non-physician-intensive services. The gap in
outsourcing intensity is between 9 and 25 percentage points larger for physician-intensive
services, although the result is not statistically significant for district hospitals.
The second column of Table 5 shows the results for labor intensity. The literature suggests
that labor-intensity may be the bias of interest for hospitals in the public sector, where
political considerations may factor into managerial decisions. The pattern of outsourcing
differences in the non-labor-intensive services is similar to that for non-physician-intensive
services, with small differentials for the private nonprofits and district hospitals but large
differentials for the local hospitals. The pattern for labor-intensive services, however, is quite
different from what we observed for physician-intensive services. For private nonprofits,
outsourcing patterns are not different between non-labor-intensive services versus labor-
intensive services, given by the small and insignificant interacted coefficient. Both types of
public hospitals, by contrast, outsource labor-intensive services at a much lower intensity.
The magnitudes of the differential in labor-intensity are quite large, between 26 (district)
and 40 (local) percent, and strongly statistically significant.
To sum, the pattern of outsourcing intensity by service-type suggests that, in addition
to having different mean levels of outsourcing intensity, the managers of public and private
nonprofits are particularly interested in maintaining control of different subsets of services.
If we think of outsourcing as a cost-control tradeoff, private nonprofits are maintaining
control of services that are physician-intensive, though act quite similar to for-profits for non-
physician-intensive services. Public hospitals also maintain increased control of physician-
intensive services, but they continue to outsource even non-physician-intensive services less
intensely than for-profits do. The pattern for labor-intensive services is quite different,
with only the public hospital especially interested in maintaining control of labor-intensive
services. To take a simple example, all three nonprofit firm types maintain (relatively) tighter
control of neo-natal intensive care than they do of groundskeeping, but public hospitals also
keep a tighter hold on social-work services and skilled nursing care, while private nonprofits
do not.
Taken together, these results illustrate three points. First, nonprofit and for-profit re-
sponses to physician-intensity and labor-intensity are distinct. Note how this contrast differs
from a comparative static exercise of comparing outsourcing rates across services within an
ownership types, as Coles and Hesterly (1998), Lopez de Silanes et al. (1997), or Levin and
Tadelis (2010) do. We can say not only that nonprofits respond to physician- and labor-
intensity, but also that they respond for reasons distinct from profit motivation.
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Second, private nonprofit and public responses to non-physician-intensity are also dis-
tinct. Whatever is driving the difference between public and for-profit outsourcing rates, it
does not seem to be the same thing that is driving the difference between private nonprofit
and for-profit rates, or at least it is not the only thing. In our model, the services for which
control is important may be different for public hospitals than for private nonprofits, and
how public hospitals bias production is not entirely captured by physician intensity. In fact,
public hospitals outsource considerably less than private nonprofits for both service bias
types, so another factor must be at work.
Finally, nonprofit and public responses to labor-intensity are distinct. Public hospitals are
distinctly interested in controlling labor-intensive services, while private nonprofits exhibit
no such pattern. Thus, this is not simply a result of a nonprofits’ lack of residual claimancy,
a feature both types share. There is some evidence that public hospitals are particularly
sensitive to labor. Clark and Milcent (2011) find, for example, that public hospitals in
France react to rising local unemployment rates by increasing employment, while private
nonprofit hospitals show no similar pattern. This is also support for (Andrei Shleifer 1994),
where unorganized voters mean public firms are more prone to capture by organized labor
and political patronage. We document another effect of public hospitals apparent interest
in control of labor–it can lead them to draw the boundaries of the firm in a way that differs
from both for-profit firms and private nonprofits.
4.4 Predictions 3 and 4: Outsourcing After a Fixed-Cost Shock
The third prediction of the model is, if outsourcing is a tradeoff between cost and control
of production, the decisions of nonprofit and for-profit firms should become more similar as
budgets tighten. This prediction arises directly from the concavity of the nonprofit’s utility
from qualifying spending. If there is a large fixed cost shock, the amount available to spend
on qualifying spending is relatively low, and the marginal value to the nonprofit firm of an
extra dollar is high.
We use a change in regulatory requirements enacted in California in 1994 to capture a
fixed-cost shock. This regulation (SB 1953) required short-term general care hospitals in
earthquake zones to meet relatively strict engineering standards. The regulation went into
effect in 1998, and the first deadline for meeting the loosest standard (no SPC-1, extremely
vulnerable, buildings) was January 2008. A stricter standard (no SPC-2, vulnerable, build-
ings) was mandated for January 2030. For many hospitals, meeting this requirement involved
very extensive retrofitting of existing buildings, and most have preferred to construct new
buildings, at costs of tens to hundreds of millions of dollars (Meade and Hillestand 2007).
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The hospitals should, thus, have been aware of existence of the shock throughout our sample
period, although they may have learned over time about their exact cost.
The actual costs incurred to retrofit or construct new buildings that meet the mandate
will be endogenously determined by the firm, but we proxy for the underlying exogenous
cost shock by the peak ground acceleration in the location– a measure of earthquake risk
(Meade, Kulick and Hillestand 2002). Peak ground acceleration is the maximum fraction of
the acceleration of gravity that will occur with a 10-percent probability over the next 50 years;
a higher value is more costly. See Chang and Jacobson (2011) for an extensive discussion
of the implementation of the mandate, and an overview of the relationship between peak
ground acceleration and costs.21 The peak ground acceleration of hospitals in our dataset
ranges from 0.05 to 1.15. The distribution is centered around the mode of 0.45 and falls
off evenly to either side, with a standard deviation of 0.21. The four ownership types have
similar peak ground acceleration average values, about 0.50.
Table 6 presents the results a variant of Equation (1) in which we interact ownership
type with the peak ground acceleration experienced by the hospital. The prediction is
that the difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals should be most marked when
acceleration is small (and the cost shock is least severe). Column (1) presents the results on
the full sample of services, while the remaining columns break the services into sub-samples
with respect to physician- and labor- intensity.
If differences in outsourcing indeed shrink as budgets tighten, we would expect the great-
est difference in outsourcing to occur when there is no cost shock to the hospital’s budget.
The non-interacted ownership indicators of Table 6 are the predicted difference in outsourc-
ing intensity between the indicated ownership type and a for-profit for a hypothetical hospital
that experienced no earthquake risk. In the full sample, regression (1), low-shock private
nonprofits outsource between 21 percent less intensely and local hospitals 55 percent less in-
tensely than low-shock for-profit hospitals. To understand the effects of tightening budgets,
the interacted coefficients of ownership and acceleration show the direction of change from
initial differences as fixed costs increase. The interacted variables all have large positive
coefficients, which indicates that the expected outsourcing differential shrinks as the cost
shock grows, although none of the interactions are statistically significant in the full sample.
The relationship between Table 6’s cost shocks and outsourcing differentials is more
clearly seen in figures. Figure 4 shows the predicted outsourcing difference between hospitals
of the indicated ownership type and a similarly situated for-profit hospital as a function of
the size of the fixed cost shock. The solid line shows the expected difference, and the dotted
21Chang and Jacobson provided us with this acceleration measure, for which we are very grateful.
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Table 6: Outsourcing and Seismic Cost Shocks
Physician Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Intensive Not Intensive Not
Non-Profit −0.213∗ −0.480∗∗ −0.173 −0.204 −0.209∗
(0.113) (0.224) (0.117) (0.227) (0.116)
District −0.255∗ −0.175 −0.263∗ −0.365 −0.241
(0.145) (0.254) (0.153) (0.238) (0.154)
Local −0.550∗∗ −0.974∗∗ −0.470∗ −1.487∗∗∗ −0.415
(0.262) (0.431) (0.259) (0.567) (0.262)
Non-Profit x Acc 0.256 0.759∗ 0.182 0.238 0.252
(0.214) (0.442) (0.216) (0.433) (0.218)
District x Acc 0.248 −0.048 0.286 0.210 0.255
(0.284) (0.462) (0.296) (0.474) (0.291)
Local x Acc 0.326 0.699 0.257 1.461 0.159
(0.437) (0.712) (0.434) (0.896) (0.433)
Peak Acceleration −0.142 −0.604 −0.068 −0.373 −0.107
(0.226) (0.436) (0.230) (0.432) (0.234)
Hospital controls yes yes yes yes yes
HSA controls yes yes yes yes yes
county FE yes yes yes yes yes
service FE yes yes yes yes yes
service-specific output yes yes yes yes yes
n 194k 26k 168k 22k 172k
Dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs that are outside contracts, and includes only
those observations with positive outsourcing. HSA controls include population, percent black, percent poor,
median household earnings, and four educational mix variables. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Standard
errors, clustered by hospital, in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10. Dependent variable
excludes all physician services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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lines are 95-percent confidence intervals. A negative number along the vertical axis means
that hospitals of the indicated type outsource less intensely than similarly-situated for-profits
do. As peak ground acceleration grows, the predicted difference approaches zero for all three
ownership types. At the mean peak ground acceleration (0.5), we can strongly reject the null
of no difference for the local hospitals, and marginally so for private nonprofits and district
hospitals. However, by the time we reach the maximum peak ground acceleration in our
sample (1.15), only local hospitals show predicted outsourcing less than for-profit hospitals.
Turning to the service-type subsamples, the final prediction of the model is that, as bud-
gets tighten, outsourcing differences should change the most in high-bias services. Columns
(2)-(5) show regressions with interacted ownership type and fixed cost shocks, separating out
those services designated “intensive” from the “non-intensive” services for both physician-
and labor-intensity. In the physician columns, the two sets of non-interacted coefficients
predict behavior in the absence of cost-shocks. We again see support of Prediction 2, that
private nonprofits are much less likely to outsource services with high physician-intensity,
and local hospitals are less likely to outsource any service. As the cost shock grows, however,
private nonprofits start to outsource these physician-intensive services, as shown by the large
positive coefficient (0.8) on the interacted variable in column (2). Non-physician-intense ser-
vices do not see such a change with increasing fixed costs, as evidenced by the small (0.2)
and statistically insignificant interacted coefficient in column (3). We present these results
graphically in Figure 5. The top figures show the differences in outsourcing between the
ownership type and a for-profit as the fixed cost shock increases over the horizontal axis.
Notice that private nonprofits and local hospitals both show a clear upward slope that crosses
or approaches zero, indicating that as fixed costs grow, the differences shrink. In contrast,
the right-hand figures show the relationship between outsourcing for non-physician intense
services, where the slopes begin closer to zero and remain fairly flat.
For labor-intensive services, columns (4) and (5) show that, again, local hospitals dif-
ferentially keep control of most services. However, low-shock local hospitals especially keep
control of labor-intensive services (column (4)). Private nonprofits are not differentially re-
sponsive to cost shocks for labor intensive services, with similar coefficients in both column
(4) and column (5). The interacted coefficients on labor-intensity and peak ground acceler-
ation are positive, suggesting that nonprofits begin to act more like for-profits as fixed costs
increase. These coefficients are not significant for the average level of peak ground acceler-
ation. To see the relationship for the range of acceleration values, we present these results
graphically in Figure 6. Note local hospitals’ steep gradient of the relationship between in-
creasing fixed costs and outsourcing for labor-intensive services, significantly different from
zero at low fixed costs. However, the non-labor-intensive service relationship remains flat.
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Throughout, we can find no significant results for district hospitals (although the full-
sample results are marginal), perhaps because they make up a relatively small fraction of
the hospitals.
The final point to note is that the seismic cost shocks do not seem to be strongly cor-
related with the outsourcing intensity of the for-profit firms, as the uninteracted effect of
peak acceleration is never significant (although in the case of labor- and physician-intensive
services, it is quite large). This is consistent with a simple model of the (null) effect of
fixed-cost on profit maximization.
5 Alternative Explanations
Although we believe that the difference in trade-off between net revenues and production
bias induced by the non-distribution constraint is the best explanation of the outsourcing
pattern that we observe, we recognize that alternative explanations exist. In this section we
consider several leading candidates.
Nonprofits may simply have a bigger in-house production possibility frontier. Maybe
the employees of nonprofits are more intrinsically motivated and donate labor, because they
agree with the mission, which lowers the cost of performing services in-house. Maybe the
tax advantages lower the real cost of in-house production. But if this story is driving the
observed patterns, why do nonprofits’ outsourcing decisions conform more with for-profits
when times are tough? If it is simply a difference in production constraints, and not a
difference in the marginal willingness-to-substitute between cost and production bias, we
should see for-profit and nonprofit firms respond similarly to fixed-cost shocks, but they do
not.
Alternatively, outsourcing could involve a non-monetary management effort. The firm
uses costly time and expertise to go out and cultivate a good relationship with a service
provider. Since money is less valuable than time or effort to nonprofits, relative to the
for-profit (on the margin), nonprofits are less likely to want to make this investment in
provider relationships. This story could be captured in our model, where the production bias
here is simply managerial effort slack. This alternative explanation could emerge from the
exemption of teaching hospitals from the prohibition of directly employing physician labor. If
teaching hospitals are more likely to be nonprofit, this may lead to less contracting experience
disproportionately for nonprofits. This interpretation of management effort is inconsistent
with the data, however, at least for private nonprofits, because this inexperience/managerial
slack would have to manifest itself only in selective portions of the hospital’s contracting of
32
(a) Nonprofit
(b) District
(c) Local
Figure 4: Intensive Margin Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks
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(a) Nonprofit, Physician-Intense (b) Nonprofit, Non-Physician-Intense
(c) District, Physician-Intense (d) District, Non-Physician-Intense
(e) Local, Physician-Intense (f) Local, Non-Physician-Intense
Figure 5: Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks and Physician-Intensity
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(a) Nonprofit, Labor-Intense (b) Nonprofit, Non-Labor-Intense
(c) District, Labor-Intense (d) District, Non-Labor-Intense
(e) Local, Labor-Intense (f) Local, Non-Labor-Intense
Figure 6: Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks and Labor-Intensity
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services outside of physician employment. In the data, nonprofits seem just as willing as
for-profits to put in the managerial effort to outsource non-physician-intensive services, like
grounds and maintenance or accounting services.
One other difference between nonprofits and for-profits that we have not explored is the
firm’s ability to access credit markets. Since nonprofits are not able to issue equity, they
have a restricted set of instruments available to generate cash. If nonprofits have a hard time
getting trade credit from suppliers, they may prefer the constant, certain cost of employment
over the fluctuating costs of contracting. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the
attractiveness of outsourcing increasing as the budget gets tighter and free cash, presumably,
declines. If doing services in-house minimizes cash demands, nonprofits should bring even
more services in-house when a cost shock makes cash even more valuable. We observe the
opposite.
A related concern is that nonprofits garner a significant fraction of their capital from
endowments, financed by donors. Maybe donors like to buy capital goods, rather than fund
contracts to outside providers. Once the capital is in place, the benefit of outsourcing the
labor, alone, is small. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the pattern we see in the
outsourcing of labor-intensive services. For public hospitals, we know that labor-intensive
services are relatively less intensively outsourced, but for private nonprofits there seems to be
no difference in relative outsourcing between labor-intensive and non-labor intensive services.
These patterns suggest that the labor/capital mix has little to do with outsourcing decisions
(in the private nonprofit case) or goes the “wrong way” (in the public case).
Finally, there could be a sample selection story. Maybe some services are profitable
for a small hospital to offer only if outsourcing opportunities exist. Nonprofits offer these
services whether the services are profitable or not, while for-profits only offer them if they
are profitable (Horwitz 2007). If this were the case, we would see these particular services
being differentially done in-house by nonprofits, even though if all hospitals offered them,
outsourcing rates would be similar. To check this, we limit our investigation to a subsample
of services that are offered by nearly all hospitals, yet the size/significance of the relationships
we identify are quite similar. If the outsourcing patterns were mostly a selection story, we
should see these differences get much smaller in the non-selected sample.
6 Conclusion
We find that private nonprofit, public, and for-profit hospitals consistently and significantly
differ in the extent to which they outsource services. Controlling for a variety of poten-
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tial confounders, nonprofit and district hospitals outsource less than for-profits, and local
hospitals outsource least of all. The difference between nonprofits and for-profits seems to
be driven by services for which control of the manner of production is particularly impor-
tant. The sort of services for which control is important seems to differ between public
and private nonprofits, however. Finally, all types of nonprofit hospitals come to look more
like for-profits if they are hit with a large fixed-cost shock, such as an expensive seismic
retrofitting requirement. For the private nonprofits, all of these results are consistent with
a model in which a non-distribution constraint leads nonprofits to trade off between costs
and control at a different rate than for-profits do. The private nonprofit differential seems
to be driven primarily by physician-intensive services, suggesting the elite workers may be
influencing managers to keep control of the services that are important to them, but that
does not seem to be the complete story for local public hospitals. Instead, it looks like pub-
lic hospitals also prefer to conduct labor-intensive services in house, suggesting the public
managers (are induced to) value control over labor per-se. All these differences are tested
on services excluding physician costs, so differences in behavior are from choices outside of
physician contracting legislation.
These findings shed new light on two literatures: the determinants of the make-or-buy
decision in organizations other than traditional profit-maximizing firms and the differential
behavior of nonprofit versus for-profit versus public firms.
We provide the first empirical demonstration that there is an economically significant
divergence between the way for-profit firms draw their firm boundaries and the way that
similarly-situated nonprofit and public firms do. This difference occurs both in terms of
levels and in terms of how the boundaries move in response to cost shocks. Furthermore, it is
not simply a difference between nonprofit and for-profit firms, because the difference between
public nonprofits and private nonprofits is just as big as the difference between private for-
profits and private nonprofits. In brief, if we think about outsourcing as a tradeoff between
cost and control over the manner of production, nonprofits seem to value cost relatively less
and control relatively more, at least as long as the nonprofit is not too close to its shut-down
constraint. One way of putting the public hospitals into this story is that they value control
over production much more than they value costs, especially for tasks that are labor-heavy.
The extent to which models of outsourcing behavior derived in the for-profit context can
be directly applied to the decisions of public and nonprofit organizations depends on the
economic circumstances in which these organizations find themselves. When firms’ budgets
are relatively tight, nonprofit firms seem to make outsourcing decisions in much the same
way as for-profit firms do. But when nonprofit firms are far from their shut-down constraint
they seem to deviate more strongly from for-profits.
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Second, we provide new evidence about other dimensions of production differences across
ownership types. Nonprofits not only provide a broader range of services (Horwitz 2007),
they perform a larger fraction of those services themselves. Finally, consistent with much of
the literature (Chang and Jacobson 2011, Duggan 2002), we find that the three ownership
types react very differently to economic shocks. In particular, nonprofits and for-profits react
quite similarly along the extensive margin (much like they do along the shut-down margin
(Chang and Jacobson 2011)), but react very differently along the intensive margin. This
is more evidence that nonprofits act very much like budget-limited consumers, and not like
unconstrained profit maximizers.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Lemma 1: bfp ≤ bnp The first-order condition for the non-profit’s choice of bias is ρ +
v′(I(bnp))I ′(bnp) = 0, while that for the for-profit is ρ + I ′(bfp) max{1, v′(I(bfp))} = 0. At
the non-profit’s bias choice, the for-profit’s marginal benefit from increasing bias is the same
(ρ), while his marginal cost is weakly greater, so he weakly prefers lower bias (strict when
I(bnp) > q, so the for-profit is using non-qualifying expenditures).
Proposition and Corollary 1 Using the Ij(b) notation, we know by revealed preference
that Inp(b
np) ≤ Ifp(bnp) and Ifp(bfp) ≤ Inp(bfp). It follows immediately from the continuity
of the indifference curves that there exists a b ∈ [bfp, bnp] such that Ifp(b) = Inp(b). Since the
nonprofit firm has strictly convex indifference sets, the curves can cross only once (although
they will lie on top of each other when qfp = qnp), yielding uniqueness, and if bfp 6= bnp is must
the bias of intersection must lie strictly between them. Once existence and uniqueness are
established, the enumerated conditions are immediate. Finally, the condition for outsourcing
follows from the definition of I. The corollary follows from the fact that Ij(b) ≥ I(b), so if
the outsourcing production frontier is outside the own-production frontier only when b < b∗,
then for the range of interest Inp > Ifp and for-profits will outsource whenever nonprofits
do. The other case is similar.
Proposition 2 For some set of parameters, take some b < b∗. From Proposition 1, Inp(b)−
Ifp(b) > 0. Inp(b) is defined implicitly by
v(Inp(b)− F ) + ρb = v(Inp − F ) + ρbnp.
The implicit function theorem allows us to calculate the derivative of Inp(b) with respect to
F :
(3)
∂Inp(b)
∂F
=
v′(Inp(b)− F )− v′(Inp − F )
v′(Inp(b))
< 0,
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where the sign of the numerator comes from the fact that v′ is decreasing and Inp(b) > Inp,
since b < b∗ < bnp. Note, we use the envelope theorem here to ignore the effect F through
bnp. We can perform a similar exercise to calculate the derivative with respect to ρ:
(4)
∂Inp(b)
∂ρ
=
bnp − b
v′(Inp(b))
> bnp − b,
where the final inequality holds since v′ ≤ 1.
Finally
(5)
∂2Inp(b)
∂ρ∂F
=
(∂bnp/∂F )
v′(Inp(b))
− b
np − b
[v′(Inp(b))]2
v′′(Inp(b))(
∂Inp(b)
∂F
) < 0,
since both terms are negative. The first, since (∂bnp/∂F ) < 0 and the second since both
v′′(·) < 0 and (∂Inp(b)
∂F
) < 0 (from equation 3, above), but bnp > b.
Similarly, when bfp 6= bnp (the only time there is any difference in behavior), Ifp(b) is
implicitly defined by
Ifp(b)− q + v(q)− F + ρb = Ifp − q + v(q)− F + ρbfp,
and can by solved for explicitly as Ifp(b) = Ifp + ρ(b
fp − b). The derivative with respect
to F is zero, while the derivative with respect to ρ is bfp − b, and the cross-partial is zero.
Comparing these derivatives to those derived above for the nonprofit gives the results of the
proposition. For F , and the cross-partial, it is immediate. For ρ, it follows from the fact
that bnp ≥ bfp.
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